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It is a familiar thought from the rule of law literature and from everyday life that
legal norms within a given jurisdiction ought to be consistent. However, little work has
been done to explain this demand. This Article develops a theory of legal inconsistencies,
both what they are and why legal systems ought to avoid them. In addition to contributing
to a theoretical discussion of legal inconsistency, the Article also articulatesa remedy
under American law for those harmed by inconsistencies.The Article contends that legal
inconsistenciesviolate Due Process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sixteen-year-old Cormega Copening faced an unusual prosecution. He was charged
with possession of child pornography because his cell phone contained an explicit
1
photograph of himself Some scholars think our child pornography laws are too zealous,
2
others think the American suite of broad laws and tough penalties could go even further.

1. E.g., Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 209 (2001) (criticizing
sex panic surrounding child sexuality); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Expansion of Child Pornography Law,
21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 321, 336 (2018) (noting and criticizing far-reaching definitions of child pornography);
Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography,89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1451-61 (2014) (offering a narrow
understanding of child pornography that better tracks the real harms that production of such material causes);
Elizabeth P. Evans, Internet Access Restrictionsfor Convicted Child PornographySex Offenders: How Far Is
Too Far?,36 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 329, 330 (2012) (criticizing extreme adverse action taken against former
child pornographers, particularly court orders that ban them from accessing the Internet, concluding "while
restriction [on Internet use] may be warranted in certain situations, a full ban on Internet access is not
appropriate"). For particular criticisms of sexting laws, see Alexandra Kushner, The Need for Sexting Law
Reform: Appropriate Punishments for Teenage Behaviors, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 288 (2013)
("[S]exting should not be criminalized at all for teenagers who consent to it and keep the exchange private ....
[C]riminalizing sexting can harm teenagers and be ineffective in addressing the sexting issue."); Stephen F.
Smith, Jailfor Juvenile Child Pornographers?:A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 505, 516
(2008) ("With few exceptions ... , the heavy hand of the criminal law should not be brought to bear against
minors who make or distribute pornographic images of themselves. Minors in this category should be regarded
either as victims in need of help to turn their lives around or, at the very least, not wrongdoers deserving of the
severe vengeance and blame society justifiably imposes on adults and others who sexually abuse children.").
2. E.g., Belinda Tiosavljevic, A Field Dayfor Child PornographersandPedophilesIf the Ninth Circuit Gets
Its Way: Striking Down the Constitutionaland Necessary Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 Free
Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), 42 S. TEx. L. REv. 545, 571 (2001) (defending the
constitutionally overbroad federal law aimed at stamping out child pornography); Kelley Bergelt, Stimulation by
Simulation:Is There Really Any Difference Between Actual and Virtual Child Pornography?The Supreme Court
Gives Child Pornographersa New Vehiclefor Satisfaction, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 565 (2003) (arguing for laws that
ban fake child pornography); Robert M. Sieg, Attempted Possession of Child Pornography-A Proposed
Approach for Criminalizing Possession of Child Pornographic Images of Unknown Origin, 36 U. TOL. L.
REv. 263 (2005) (developing a new legal theory to facilitate prosecuting more people for conduct related to child
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Whatever the wisdom of such laws as they currently stand, something seems particularly
odd about Copening's prosecution. Given our reasons for having child pornography laws,
prosecuting Copening for possessing the picture of himself is not only unhelpful but also
counterproductive. Through such laws, society seeks to protect children's privacy, but
prosecuting Copening required the invasion of his privacy. Here, then, is an example of a
prosecutorial decision that is inconsistent with the justification for the criminal statute.
Copening was also charged with corruption of a minor for sending the same
photograph to his sixteen-year-old girlfriend, Briana Denson. There is something strange
about this too. In North Carolina, the jurisdiction where these events took place, Copening
3
and Denson were allowed to engage in sexual activity with one another, even as minors.
This means, as one commentator put it, "Copening and Denson came up against a
counterintuitive confluence of laws." 4 To see this, consider the following question: what
would justify a legislator in thinking that sight of Copening's body corrupts Denson when
in the form of a photograph but not when he appears in person? Though one might
disagree, it is understandable to claim that sight of Copening in a sexual pose always
corrupts Denson, whether in person or in photograph. It is also understandable to claim
that sight of Copening in a sexual pose does not corrupt Denson in person or in photograph.
The confluence is more puzzling. Here, then, is an example of inconsistency between the
5
justifications of two laws.
This Article concerns inconsistencies in the law. More precisely, it concerns the
Consistency Principle, a central component of the rule of law. 6 Roughly, the principle
provides that, within a jurisdiction, the laws should be consistent. This Article investigates
the scope of the Consistency Principle, its justification, and what American courts should
do when that principle is violated.
The first part of this Article concerns the scope and justification of the Consistency
Principle. Nearly everyone can agree that the Principle prohibits a jurisdiction from giving
legal effect to norms that contradict one another, 7 but determining what counts as
contradiction is far more complicated than previous writers have noticed. It is natural to
believe that a set of laws satisfy the Consistency Principle so long as an individual can act
in accordance with every law in the set. Upon inspection, this turns out to be too narrow
an understanding of the Principle as the Copening case demonstrates. Deep inconsistencies
surround his prosecution, but Copening was perfectly capable of acting in accord with the
"counterintuitive confluence of laws." He just didn't. As for defending the Consistency
Principle, some have claimed that jurisdictions ought to heed the Principle because

pornography).
3. Michael E. Miller, N.C. Just Prosecuted a Teenage Couple for Making Child Porn - of Themselves,
WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/21/n-c-justprosecuted-a-teenage-couple-for-making-child-porn-of-themselves/?utm term=.6519fdb248a9.
4. Id.

5. For a remarkably well-written student note discussing a related problem under Georgia law, see Emily L.
Evett, Comment, Inconsistencies in Georgia'sSex-Crime Statutes Teach Teens That Sexting Is Worse Than Sex,
67 MERCER L. REV.405 (2016).

6. Lon Fuller was one of the first scholars to state explicitly that the rule of law includes the Consistency
Principle. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 65-70 (rev. ed. 1969).
7. Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage,51 FLA. L. REv. 799, 830-31 (1999) ("[lIt is a

basic principle of our judicial system that a person not be subject to inconsistent laws.").
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otherwise laws could not fulfill their primary function, action guidance. 8 Upon inspection,
this is also too narrow, and again the Copening case shows us why: inconsistent laws can
guide action.
The first part of the Article, then, is a theoretical argument, one that aims to show
that the Consistency Principle has wider scope and requires different defense than others
have recognized. This theoretical argument relies on the Copening case as well as several
other cases of inconsistencies, historical and contemporary, domestic and foreign, to
demonstrate that the problem is not merely academic. That real-life individuals have
suffered from violation of the Consistency Principle prompts the second, more practical
part of the Article.
The second part of the Article develops a theory of legal relief for the teens ensnarled
in the sexting case and, more generally, for anyone who suffers under inconsistency. Part
II also responds to various objections to implementing that theory of relief. While there
are other potential fixes for the specific problem faced by these young people, on the best
theory of legal remedy, all violations of the Consistency Principle are unconstitutional
denials of due process.
II. TOWARD

BETrER UNDERSTANDING THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE

The rule of law is a normative standard, usually understood as composed of several
principles, all of which detail how a legal system can go awry qua legal system. 9 Scholars
disagree about the precise list of principles that the rule of law requires, 10 but many would
11
agree that the rule of law includes the Consistency Principle.

8. Id. at 831 ("When a person is subject to inconsistent laws, that person cannot conform his or her conduct
to the law."); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsideringthe Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 786 (1989) (offering
an interpretation of Fuller on which the point of the Consistency Principle is so that legal subjects can know what
they ought to do and perform accordingly); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as A Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 n.27 (1997) (agreeing with Radin that the Consistency
Principle can be "fairly subsumed by the requirement that law should be capable of being followed").
9. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure,50 NOMOS 3, 5 (2011) ("Theorists

of the Rule of Law are fond of producing laundry lists of demands."); for just one list of principles, see Renaldy
J. Gutierrez, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Myth or Reality?, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 803, 804 (2009) (citing the
four rule of law principles offered by the World Justice Project).
10. As Randall Peerenboom points out:
conceptions of rule of law can be divided into two general types, thin and thick. A thin conception
stresses the formal or instrumental aspects of rule of law--those features that any legal system must
possess to function effectively as a system of laws, regardless of whether the legal system is part of a
democratic or non-democratic society, capitalist or socialist, liberal or theocratic.... Thick
conceptions begin with the basic elements and purposes of a thin conception but then incorporate
elements of political morality such as particular economic arrangements..., forms of government...
or conceptions of human rights ....

Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?,36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809, 82728 (2005). Thin conceptions of the rule of law are advocated in the following: BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91-126 (2004); Colleen Murphy, Lon Fullerand the Moral Value
of the Rule of Law, 24 L. & PHIL. 239, 261-62 (2005); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 210-29 (2d ed. 2009). Meanwhile, thick conceptions of the rule of law are advocated in the
following work: Corey Brettschneider, A Substantive Conception of the Rule of Law: Nonarbitrary Treatment

and the Limits of Procedure,in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS L 52 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011).
11. E.g., Jurian Langer & Wolf Sauter, The Consistency Requirement in EU Law, 24 COLUM. J.EUR. L. 39,
43 (2017) ("[I]t is plausible that consistency (as a requirement of no contradictions) can be seen as an element of
the rule of law.").
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Some scholars claim that laws violate the Consistency Principle when and only when
Law, obligates someone to do something that Law2 forbids. 12 To understand what such
scholars have in mind, imagine that a truancy law required a student to be in school on
Friday morning while a court summons required that same student to appear in court that
same Friday morning. 13 If there were no exceptions to either law and no superseding
principle to remedy the conflict, this would be an inconsistency of the kind that some take
to be definitive of the problem. As I show below, this is just one kind of inconsistency in
the law; it is what I call an irreconcilableinconsistency between laws. This name stems
from the fact that a person cannot reconcile herself to the laws' demands, for she cannot,
under any circumstances, remain in the jurisdiction and avoid non-compliance with the
inconsistent set of laws. 14
Though troubling when it arises, any given irreconcilable inconsistency is likely to
be short-lived because courts and legislatures have tools specifically designed to remedy
them. For example, legislatures and courts sometimes directly say in the text of a new law
or ruling that any prior legal norm that is inconsistent with the current law or ruling is
hereby null and void. This is a prophylactic measure to stop irreconcilable inconsistencies
before they start. In addition to this prophylactic approach, there are remedies on the back
end. Courts often decide, as a canon of statutory construction, that where two laws conflict,
15
the later enactments supersede prior ones.
Despite being short-lived phenomena, irreconcilable inconsistencies receive most of
the scholarly, judicial, and legislative attention in conversations about the Consistency
Principle. This undue attention not only upstages more persistent kinds of inconsistency
but also obfuscates the general reason why inconsistencies harm legal subjects. This Part
of the Article focuses on the other kinds of inconsistency and on the obfuscation.
To preview the latter point, scholars are confused about the general problem that
inconsistency presents. They focus on a particular problem that arises with irreconcilable
inconsistencies: the action guidance problem. It is probably beyond dispute that a legal
system fails, qua legal system, if its norms cannot guide action. If nothing else, laws should
guide action. 16 To be clear, this is part of the reason why the rule of law forbids
irreconcilable inconsistencies. Because other sorts of inconsistencies do not pose action

12. This conception of Consistency probably motivated Bruegger, given that he claimed, "It is impossible to
simultaneously comply with laws that are contradictory." John A. Bruegger, Freedom, Legality, and the Rule of
Law, 9 WASH. U. JUR. REv. 81, 87 (2016). But see, e.g., FULLER, supra note 6, at 69 (construing inconsistency
very broadly as laws "that do not go together or do not go together well").
13. 1assume that the school is not the court, and the student cannot be in two places at once.
14. Once at a lecture, I errantly claimed that an irreconcilable inconsistency obtains when one cannot, under
any circumstances, avoid non-compliance. Someone replied that one could always avoid non-compliance by
suicide. This is not strictly speaking true, for suicide is not always an available legal out: a jurisdiction might
criminalize suicide. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the reply is right; sometimes one can avoid noncompliance by leaving the jurisdiction, whether by death or emigration. I want to distinguish inconsistencies one
can avoid only by leaving the jurisdiction from other kinds. The difference between this kind of inconsistency
and the others will become important below, see infra Part II.A.
15. E.g., Eisenberg v. Coming, 179 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949). For commentary on the lex posterior
derogatprioricanon of construction, see HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 206 (Max Knight trans., 2d rev.
ed., 1967).
16. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40 (1961) (claiming that the primary function of law is to
guide action).
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guidance problems, however, action guidance cannot wholly explain why the rule of law
includes the Consistency Principle. Moreover, as I explain below, action guidance is not
even the whole story with irreconcilable inconsistencies.
A. Improved Taxonomy
There are four main ways to violate the Consistency Principle. Because we already
discussed irreconcilable inconsistencies between laws above, we now turn to the other
three. For each kind of violation, I rely on simple, hypothetical examples. The simplistic
examples help to illustrate the kind of violation most clearly. Real life has too many details;
that explains the currency of the old saying about failing to see the forest for the trees.
1. Reconcilable Inconsistencies between Laws
The first (new) kind of inconsistency is what I call reconcilable inconsistencies
between laws. This occurs where Law, sets a standard of behavior, compliance with which
constitutes non-compliance with Law 2 , yet compliance with both laws is possible only by
refraining from the relevant activity or by greater performance when one standard sets a
lower bar for compliance than the other. 17 Here are some examples.
Suppose that along a stretch of highway, there was a speed limit of fifty-five miles
per hour. Suppose also along the same stretch, there was a speed minimum of sixty miles
per hour. These two laws are clearly inconsistent, but they are not irreconcilably so. An
irreconcilable inconsistency obtains only when one cannot avoid non-compliance with at
least one of the laws while remaining in the jurisdiction. Of course, here non-compliance
is easily avoided: one can choose not to drive at all. Still, this is something that the rule of
law should forbid.
Consider another case. Suppose that a law provides that adultery is illegal and
subject to penalties, while another law in the same jurisdiction, passed on the same day,
provides that adultery is legal and subject to no penalties. 18 The two laws are clearly
inconsistent but not irreconcilably so, for one can just avoid committing adultery. This
case, however, brings out something of note about the perspective from which to judge
whether there is irreconcilable inconsistency. It is the prospective of the person subject to
the legal system's demands for compliance. If I lived in that jurisdiction, qua legal subject,
I would live under inconsistent laws with which I can nonetheless comply. But think of
the perspective of the police officer to whose attention adulterous behavior is brought.
Because of her position, she may face different requirements of compliance. Perhaps, the
officer faces an irreconcilableinconsistency because she is under duty to enforce all and
only that which has been criminalized. 19 If she arrests someone for adultery, she acts

17. For Colleen Murphy, the Consistency Principle only provides that "[o]ne law cannot prohibit what
another law permits." Murphy, supra note 10, at 241. Murphy is plausibly read as talking about reconcilable

inconsistencies. When one law prohibits what another permits, compliance is still possible, as one might simply
refrain from doing what is prohibited by the other act.
18. This example is borrowed from KELSEN, supra note 15, at 207-08. Also, this proceeding point about the
perspective of the legal official is inspired by Kelsen's well-known claim that law is directed to officials, not
subjects.
19. Of course, no law enforcement officer is under such a duty. It would be impossible to fulfill and stupid
to try because every law enforcement agency must prioritize.
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contrary to the law that claims that the act is permissible; if she fails to arrest for adultery,
she acts contrary to the command to arrest for all violations of the criminal law.
Consider a third case. In this case, I move from duty-imposing laws to powerconferring laws. 20 Suppose that a statute mentioned the full list of requirements for a valid
will. Among these is the requirement that testator shall have a witness. Suppose that a
provision of another statute, passed the same day as the first, requires a testator to have
two witnesses. These laws are inconsistent, for compliance with the first law - having a
sole witness - is non-compliance with the second, which requires two witnesses. However,
the inconsistency is not irreconcilable. A potential testator can get two witnesses, allowing
her to comply with both laws. Now, if the first law required one to have one and only one
witness and the second law required two witnesses, the potential testator would be in a
deeper bind, but this conflict still would not be irreconcilable. She couldjust forgo creating
a will altogether.21 The mark of irreconcilability is when compliance is impossible so long
as the person regulated remains within the jurisdiction.
2. Inconsistencies between the Justifications of Laws
Another way to violate the Consistency Principle is to have laws with inconsistent
justifications. A set of laws features inconsistent justifications when the only legally
permissible reasons for enacting and retaining Law, make it irrational to enact and retain
Law2. Here is another way to put the point. A set of laws features inconsistent justifications
when there is no rationally coherent set of legally permissible reasons for enacting and
retaining Law, and Law 2 .

Consider the following example. Suppose that one municipal ordinance (MO 1)
forbids park visitors from cutting down the trees in the park. Suppose also that another
municipal ordinance (MO 2) explicitly permits park visitors to burn down trees in the same
park. This confluence of laws should seem strange. If one considers possible reasons why
a legislative body would enact MO 1, reasons that come to mind may include maintaining
the park's natural beauty, preventing accidents, retaining natural sources of shade, and
even combating the rise in greenhouse gases. All of those goals are defeated by having
MO 2 .

To be clear, an instance of such inconsistency cannot be understood as the more
familiar issue of one law being over- or under-inclusive. 22 A law is under-inclusive when
it fails to solve all of a problem it sets out to solve. A law is over-inclusive when it
'remedies' something that was not part of the problem. A set of laws has inconsistent
justifications when one law develops a remedy for a problem and the other law undermines
pursuing that remedy or disparages seeing the problem as a genuine problem. An underinclusive law may still turn out to be a reasonable law because trying to solve the whole
problem may turn out to be too cumbersome. An over-inclusive law may also still turn out
to be a reasonable law because distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate

20. For the distinction between duty-imposing and power-conferring laws, see HART, supra note 16, at 2638.
21. Indeed, most Americans do not have a will. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will,
GALLUP (May 18,2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx.

22. I thank Michelle Dempsey for raising this issue and inviting me to clarify this point.
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targets of the government action may be too costly. 23 A set of laws with inconsistent
justifications will always be unreasonable because the laws undermine one another, just
as the law providing that the truant student appear in court undermines the law providing
that the student appear in school at the same time.
Having distinguished inconsistency in justification from over- and under-inclusion,
let us turn to another example to see the role that "legally permissible reasons" plays in
understanding the phenomenon of inconsistent justifications. Suppose that a state law
allows former felons to become public schoolteachers ten years after the end of the felon's
sentence. Suppose that another state law creates an exception to that rule and forever bars
those convicted of illegal sale or possession of alkyl nitrites, colloquially known as
"poppers." The first law seeks to strike a balance between shielding children from
wrongdoers and offering forgiveness to offenders, but the second law essentially, says,
"No forgiveness for you!" where the you is those who sold or used poppers. These two
laws are not obviously inconsistent on the level of justification; perhaps the legislature
thought that poppers are particularly dangerous drugs or that former users or sellers of this
drug are particularly likely to market the stuff to children. Imagine that neither of these
claims is true, that these claims are not commonly thought to be true, and that no legislative
history or preambulatory text suggests that legislators think them true either. The
legislators in this example are not completely senseless; however, they carved out this
exception because they know that gay men are the most frequent users and sellers of
poppers. 24 In essence, the legislature wants a way to prevent gay men from serving as
schoolteachers, but, suppose again, they cannot achieve this goal directly because of
constitutional constraints. Were this all so, we would find the two state laws inconsistent
on the level of justification. There are three possible justifications for having both laws:
(1) poppers are particularly dangerous, (2) those who used and sold poppers are
particularly likely to market to children, and (3) those who used and sold poppers are
disproportionately gay men, who we despise. If reasons (1) and (2) would not be avowed
by the legislature and if reason (3) is a legally impermissible ground for government
action, there is no rationally coherent set of legally permissible reasons for these laws.
My point with the poppers example is not to suggest that the primary problem with
such laws is violation of the Consistency Principle. Rather, this example helps to illustrate
how courts should go about the task of divining the justification for a particular legal norm.
Courts should restrict the possible justifications to legally permissible grounds. If
constitutional or other legal norms declare that legislators may not rely upon reason x, then
a court cannot save a set of laws from inconsistency by claiming that legislators justified
the laws based on x.
Before concluding this section and moving on to discuss the fourth species of
inconsistency, I will raise and answer a taxonomic question that one might be wondering
about. One might wonder whether the various categories of inconsistency are truly distinct.

23. For example, during an epidemic outbreak, it may be a good idea to quarantine an entire area, as opposed
to testing each person to see if she is sick, since such testing may risk more infections.
24. Frank Romanelli et al., Poppers: Epidemiology and ClinicalManagement of Inhaled Nitrite Abuse, 24
PHARMACOTHERAPY 69, (2004) ("Inhaled nitrites ('poppers') are also a common class of drugs that have a long
history of being abused in social settings, particularly among gay and bisexual men.").

2019]

LEGAL INCONSISTENCIES

No, they are not fully distinct. Irreconcilable inconsistencies are distinct from reconcilable
inconsistencies in the sense that no single situation can both be an instance of one and an
instance of the other. However, a case of irreconcilably inconsistent laws necessarily
features inconsistent justifications, and a case of reconcilably inconsistent laws necessarily
features inconsistent justifications too. To begin to see this point, consider the fact that the
specific reason for requiring two witnesses for a will (i.e. needing someone to corroborate
the other witness) tells against any rationale for a law that only requires one witness.
Indeed, every violation of the Consistency Principle features legal norms with inconsistent
justifications. With this said, when I use the term inconsistent justifications in the
remainder of the Article, I shall imply that the legal norms in question do not feature any
other Consistency-related faults such as irreconcilable inconsistency.
3. Inconsistencies between the Justification of a Law and Its Execution
The final kind of inconsistency obtains when there is inconsistency between the
justification of a law and its execution or enforcement. 25 More formally, the violation
occurs when the method of executing a law rationally undermines that law.
Consider the following example. Suppose that a regulatory agency sought to regulate
the production of widgets by private companies. The agency was charged with crafting
rules to improve the quality of widgets because good will, competition, and the torts
system were insufficient motivation to make manufacturers produce safe widgets. The
agency, in turn, decided to require inspections of the widget factories; however, the
inspections are self-inspections, and the agency has promulgated no rules to explain how
such inspections are to be conducted. Clearly, this is one of those 'cat watching the
henhouse' situations. The justification for having inspections is undermined by allowing
the companies to do it themselves without guidance. The requirement of inspections has
to be executed differently if the law is to meet its objective.
B. Real Life Interlude: Cormega 's Story and Other Stories of Inconsistency
To prevent anyone from thinking that violations of the Consistency Principle are
purely hypothetical, I interrupt our theoretical discussion of the proper scope and defense
of the Consistency Principle to consider several real-life violations including the case with
which we started, the Copening case.
Cormega Copening's case features two kinds of inconsistency about justification.
First, the justification for the corruption of a minor statute, as applied to him, is inconsistent
with the justification for the allowing him to have sex with Denson. Second, part of the
justification for criminalizing child pornography is inconsistent with prosecuting
Copening for this offense.
Copening's case - and sexting more generally - is not the only arena where there
are such inconsistencies. This section highlights five violations of the Consistency
Principle from various places and times. By exploring many violations, we gain a more

25. Langer & Sauter note this kind of inconsistency too. Langer, supra note 11, at 50 ("Consistency is also
part of appropriate means. For example, there should be no conflicting exceptions or inherent contradictions
between a legal norm and its application.").
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concrete understanding of the problem and we understand its scope better.
1. To Inspect or Not to Inspect?
In the early 1950s, Ira Cardiff, president of the Washington Dehydrated Food
Company, was convicted under a provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
26
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 331(f), for barring federal inspectors from entering his factory.
However, another section of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 374, authorized inspections only upon
permission granted by the factory owner in question. When Cardiff successfully appealed
his conviction, the Ninth Circuit noted the inconsistency, saying, "section 374 gives the
operator the right to refuse inspection and section 331 (f) warns him that if he exercises the
right so given him he is liable to imprisonment." 27 In our taxonomy, Cardiff faced a
reconcilable inconsistency. 28 Cardiff faced inconsistency because complying with § 374
and thereby exercising his right to exclude constituted non-compliance with § 33 1(f). This
inconsistency was reconcilable, though, because Cardiff was capable of complying with
both provisions of the FDCA while remaining within the jurisdiction. He could have just
let the inspectors inspect.
2. Crack and Powder Cocaine
While the inconsistency that menaced Ira Cardiff was obscure and only affected
factory owners, the next real-life inconsistency is the subject of great public criticism and
has ravaged the lives of thousands. I speak of the crack and powder cocaine disparity.
Crack cocaine and powder cocaine are, more or less, the same substance. Crack
cocaine is made by mixing powder cocaine with water and baking soda and then heating
the solution.2 9 Both are habit-forming stimulants derived from two species of the Coca
plant.
30
In 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into law.
Among its many provisions, this "Act provided that individuals convicted of crimes
involving 500 grams of powder cocaine or just 5 grams of crack (the weight of two
pennies) were sentenced to at least 5 years imprisonment .
,31 In other words, one had
to have one hundred times as much powder cocaine as crack cocaine to receive the same
punishment. Given that these are, more or less, the same substance, any disparity should
seem odd. If there was going to be a disparity, one would think it should go the other way,
since crack, an admixture, has less of the active ingredient than powder cocaine. On its

26.

Cardiff v. United States, 194 F.2d 686, 687 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).

27. Id.
at 688.
28. Technically speaking, of course, the inconsistency arose within a single statute. This fact is not important
for our purposes here; however, this fact will be relevant when we consider remedies for inconsistencies below.
When a single statute is inconsistent as the FDCA was in Cardiff's time, we can show that the statute violates
due process by using the rationality test. As I explain below, the rationality test commonly used in modem

substantive due process analysis will not work for most inconsistencies since the discordant norms come from
different statutes.
29. ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 1
(2006).

30. Id.
at 2.
31. Id.
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face then, these laws appear to have inconsistent justifications. Whatever reason one has
for penalizing crack users and dealers at the level one does requires one to penalize cocaine
users and dealers at an equal or greater level.
This conclusion comes too fast though. The 100:1 disparity would be justified if
legislators believed that cocaine had different effects as crack versus powder. 32 Perhaps
Congress did believe this at one time, but multiple government commissions have proven
otherwise and have recommended against the disparity. 3 3 What else might make sense of
34
the disparity? If the difference in sentencing were race-based, as many have assumed,
this would at least make sense, but it would not rescue the sentencing regime from
inconsistency. If the Congress endeavored to heap extra penalties on crack users because
such users tend to be poor Blacks, 35 this would not be a legally permissible ground of
acting. As noted above, we have inconsistency when there is no legally permissible
rationale for maintaining both laws.
Finally, it is important to remember that this disparity is no relic of the past. In 2010,
President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act 3 6 into law, which did eliminate the 100:1
38
37
disparity. But it replaced that with an 18:1 disparity. Inconsistency remains.
3. Saudi Women Operating Vehicles
Consider another situation of laws with inconsistent justifications. Until recently,
women in Saudi Arabia were forbidden from driving cars; 39 however, there was no
restriction on women flying planes in Saudi Arabia. 40 Allegedly, the restriction on women

32. Id. at 4 ('The rapid increase in the use of crack between 1984 and 1986 created many myths about the
effects of the drug in popular culture.... For example, crack was thought to be so much more addictive than
").
powder cocaine ....
33. The United States Sentencing Commission recommended eliminating the disparity entirely in 1995, but
Congress refused and requested new "guidelines that did not advocate parity." Id. at 6. A second report in 1997

recommended decreasing the disparity, which Congress again refused. A third report in 2002 again recommended
decreasing the disparity, and again Congress refused. Id.
34. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
COLORBLINDNESS 112-14 (2010).
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35. ACLU, supra note 29, at i ("Because of its relative low cost, crack cocaine is more accessible for poor
Americans, many of whom are African Americans.").
36. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844,

960).
37. Tyler B. Parks, The Unfairness of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1105, 1108
(2012).
38. United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 880 (N.D. Iowa 2011) ("[T]here is still no persuasive
rationale for maintaining the crack/powder disparity at all, let alone maintaining it at 18:1 .").
Ban On Female Drivers, NPR (June 24, 2018, 1:59 PM),
39. Shannon Van Sant, Saudi Arabia Lifts

https://www.npr.org/2018/06/24/622990978/saudi-arabia-lifts-ban-on-women-drivers. There was not a specific
law that forbade women from driving; rather, there was a national policy of not issuing driver's licenses to
women, and in turn, any woman caught driving was guilty of driving without a license.

40. Adam Taylor, An All-Female Crew Lands a Plane in Saudi Arabia. But They Can't Drive From the
Airport., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/15/an-

all-female-crew-lands-a-plane-in-saudi-arabia-but-they-cant-drive-from-theairport/?noredirect=on&utm term=.d56cle1970ef. To be clear, Saudi Arabia did not merely lack a law
prohibiting women from flying planes, which one might see as mere oversight. Saudi Arabia explicitly licensed
women to fly, and much was made of this. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Female Saudi Pilot Flies High, ARAB NEWS
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.arabnews.com/news/558946.
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42
41
driving was undergirded by concerns about women's safety and spiritual welfare.

These concerns are likely very misguided. Nonetheless, if one has these sorts of concerns,
what sense does it make to allow women to fly planes? If one opposes women driving

because they might be exposed to men outside their families, this can happen in a car or a
plane. Moreover, a woman might fly her plane to a place very far from the protection of
her family. Also, if one opposes women driving because a woman out on her own might
be given to sin, (absurd and sexist as such concern may be) this result can just as easily
obtain if a woman could fly a plane to wherever she wishes.
4. Amateur Bounty Hunters
Writing in the Eighteenth Century, Cesare Beccaria criticized the Italian practice of
placing bounties on criminals' heads and allowing ordinary people to 'retrieve' the
criminal. As Beccaria put it, this system, designed to counteract lawlessness, produced
even more lawlessness. 43 We can be even more specific than Beccaria. The bounty system
was designed, not to counteract lawlessness in general, but lawless killing in particular.
However, as Beccaria noted, giving people license to kill someone they suspect is the
fugitive results in more lawless killing due to mistaken identity, mistaken aim, and
slaughtered would-be bounty hunters. In our taxonomy, this case features an inconsistency
between the justification of a law and its execution.
C. Why Inconsistency Matters
Having outlined the four basic ways that a legal system can run afoul of the
Consistency Principle and having provided four real-world examples of inconsistency, I
now turn to diagnosing the problem with inconsistency. Or, to put the point another way,
this section defends the Consistency Principle. To begin our work, I first survey and
dismiss three other theories that try to identify the problem with inconsistency. The first
three theories discussed below all track real problems, but the specific problem mentioned
by each theory is not broad enough to encompass the full range of Consistency violations.
The real problem is that one is disrespected when one's polity violates the Consistency
Principle.
1. The SAG Defense
As a first pass, one might contend that inconsistencies are problematic because, in

41. Neil MacFarquhar, Saudis Arrest Woman Leading Right-to-Drive Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/middleeast/24saudi.html ("Many opponents were religious
puritans who object to the very idea of women being exposed to strangers outside their homes by driving.");
Hassan M. Fattah, Saudi Arabia Debates Women's Right to Drive, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/middleeast/27cnd-drive.html ("Clerics and religious conservatives
maintain that allowing women to drive would open Saudi society to untold corruption. Women alone in cars,
they say, would be more open to abuse .... ").
42. Saudi Woman to Get 10 Lashes for Driving a Car, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:12 PM),
https://www.ebsnews.com/news/saudi-woman-to-get-10-lashes-for-driving-a-car/
("[T]he ban is rooted in
conservative traditions and religious views that hold giving freedom of movement to women would make them
vulnerable to sins."); Fattah, supra note 41 (mentioning arguments that if women drove, they "would become
wayward").
43.

CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, ch. XXXVI (1764).
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the paradigmatic case, that of irreconcilable inconsistencies, law no longer seems capable
of guiding action. Rendering this general thought more specific leaves us with the Simple
Action Guidance (SAG) Defense.
SAG Defense: inconsistencies are bad because they render law incapable of guiding
action at all.
The SAG Defense is obviously false. Law can guide action even when there are
irreconcilable inconsistencies. If someone faces legal penalties no matter what she does in
the jurisdiction in question, the law may encourage her to leave the jurisdiction, to conceal
herself from law enforcement, or to act so as to minimize the law's harms, say, by
complying with the legal norm with stiffer penalties, should the penalties differ.
2. The CAG Defense
One might hear the preceding list of ways that law might guide someone, despite
inconsistencies, and think: But that is not guidance in the proper way! It seems strange to
contend that the law guides someone to conceal herself from law enforcement. This
intuition should lead one to abandon the SAG Defense in favor of what I call the Clever
Action Guidance (CAG) Defense.
CAG Defense: inconsistencies are bad because they render law incapable of guiding
action as it purports.
So far, this is extraordinarily vague. Allow me to flesh this out. Although a person
can react to the law in various ways and therefore, in the weak SAG sense, be guided by
the law in various ways, there is a stronger sense of being guided by the law. The law has
a certain set of conventions by which it guides in its official way. For instance, if the law
criminalizes conduct C, the law condemns C and commands legal subjects not to perform
C. 4 4 This is true even if legal officials were to proclaim that C is a wonderful deed. If law
influences people's conduct, not in just any way, but specifically by having them comply
with its commands (commands we interpret via law's conventions), then the law guides as
it purports, or in the CAG sense. For an illustration, recall the speed limit and speed
minimum case from above. 4 5 Upon learning that, on that stretch of highway, one would
be subject to a speed minimum higher than the speed limit, one may decide not to drive on
that stretch of highway or not to drive at all. In the SAG sense, one is guided by the law,
but, arguably, one is not guided by the law in the CAG sense.
Why? Well, in a reconcilable inconsistency, the law does not guide in the CAG
sense, for there is nothing that the law commands. By having a speed limit or a speed
minimum, the law accepts that someone will drive along the stretch of highway. In fact,
the law proclaims that driving is permissible. However, the contents of the speed limit and
speed minimum together contradict that permission. In criminalizing driving above fifty
44. This is an old insight from punishment expressivists like Feinberg. See generally, Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397 (July 1965).
45.
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miles per hour and driving below sixty miles per hour, the law condemns driving altogether
along the stretch of highway. The law, thus, proclaims that driving on that stretch is
permissible and not permissible. In the same way that stating a contradiction conveys no
information, 4 6 the law says nothing at all about driving along that stretch. Thus, it cannot
47
guide.
I very much endorse CAG as a way of understanding legal norms, but the CAG
Defense-that the Consistency Principle must be observed, so that law can guide in the
way that it purports-cannot be the full story. This is not a full defense of the Consistency
Principle. Even in those cases where law does guide subjects' behavior as it purports, we
can still have instances of inconsistency, particularly laws with inconsistent justifications.
Where laws with inconsistent justifications persist, the law does not, through its
conventions, proclaim that the very same conduct is permissible and impermissible.
Instead, Law, says some conduct C, is permissible, while Law2 says some other conduct
C 2 is impermissible. The law can thus command something. The problem with such
commanding is that there is no legally permissible rationale for allowing C1 while
prohibiting C2.
If the foregoing is correct, we must look beyond action guidance and must seek a
broader explanation of the fault that Consistency violations entail.
3. The Kludge Defense
Moving beyond the action-guidance points, we might locate the problem with
inconsistency in the inefficiency and lack of accountability that usually accompanies it.
48
To make this suggestion vivid, I rely on an insightful article from Steven Teles.
Teles develops a framework for understanding how government works in America
today. America is a kludgeocracy, that is, a form of government wherein most policies are
kludges. A kludge, as Teles cites from the Oxford English Dictionary,is "an ill-assorted
collection of parts assembled to fulfill a particular purpose.. .a clumsy but temporarily
effective solution to a particular fault or problem." 4 9 As Teles explains, kludges are bad
because they cost a lot, hide how government works, and have no overarching rationale.
This last point connects up with our concern about the Consistency Principle.
Extrapolating from Teles, we should expect a kludgeocracy like ours to feature
inconsistencies.
Now, Teles is not trying to diagnose the problem with inconsistency. He is pointing
out a deep problem with the institutional design of the American government, namely that
when federalism (with overlapping magisterial), separation of powers, and supermajoritarian procedures combine, we get inefficient government that is not properly

46. Manuel Bremer, Can Contradictions Be Asserted?, 7 LOGIC & LOGICAL PHIL. 167, 169 (1999) ("[A]n

antinomy asserts nothing.").
47. I thank Chad Flanders and Mihailis Diamantis for pushing me to explain this point. This explanation not
only helps me set up and knock down a potential defense of the Consistency Principle. It also helps further
explicate what is inconsistent about reconcilable (and irreconcilable) inconsistency. Before the explication in the
text, one might be tempted to think that there is something merely inconvenient about the situation. Now, it
should be clearer that in those inconsistencies, the law speaks with two voices, canceling itself out.
48.

Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy in America, NATIONAL AFFAiRs, Fall 2013.

49. Id.
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accountable. One might depart from Teles's limited goals, however, and develop a defense
of the Consistency Principle based on his arguments. In particular, one might argue that
inconsistencies are bad because a) they signal upstream kludges and b) they, themselves,
cause inefficiency and lacks of accountability. Call this the Kludge Defense.
Those who might advocate for the Kludge Defense or some other related concern
(e.g. one cannot plan one's affairs if everything one does is criminalized), they note a real
problem with inconsistency, but, like the action-guidance defenses before it, this defense
is too narrow. Inconsistencies need not involve kludges. The crack/powder cocaine
disparity has nothing to do with kludges; it has everything to do with harming a politically
unpopular group. Also, inconsistencies need not to be inefficient. Whenever efficiency is
mentioned as a concern, one must always remember that a means is never inefficient
simpliciter,it is inefficient to a particular end. As such, some means are inefficient to one
end but very efficient for another end. Inconsistencies like the crack/powder cocaine
disparity might be inefficient to the end of stopping drug abuse, but it might be very
50
efficient for another more nefarious purpose, like re-enshrining Black subjugation.
4. The Disrespect Defense
To understand the general problem that all inconsistencies occasion, we have to
think more expansively and, in particular, more jurisprudentially. In jurisprudential
conversations, we are often looking for what distinguishes law from other behavior
guiding systems. 5 1 For instance, jurisprudence scholars ask about the difference between
law and club-rules 52 or the difference between law and morality. 5 3 Most important for our
purposes, we might think about the difference between law and the demands of a
54
mafioso.
By mafioso, I mean something rather peculiar that may depart from actual mafias. I
stipulate that law is different from the demands of the mafioso in that law features a
legitimating narrative. In our lives as legal subjects, there must be reasons why we are
subject to particular demands, reasons that have to do with promoting important values,
such as safety, freedom, equality, piety, prosperity, and the like. To the extent that the
demands are not even thought to track these values, legal subjects live under the arbitrary

50. One, of course, need not accept this particular claim about drug policy to appreciate and accept my general
point: inconsistency is not necessarily inefficient; thus, inefficiency cannot be the problem with inconsistency.
51. Danny Priel, The Boundaries of Law and the Purposeof Legal Philosophy,27 L. & PHIL. 643,646 (2008)
("Much of what descriptive legal philosophers are concerned with is the question of boundaries, that is, the proper
way of distinguishing between those things in the world that are laws and those things in the world that perhaps

bear some resemblance to law but nonetheless are not laws .... They do so by looking at legal practice and by
trying to distinguish it from other normative practices and systems of norms (etiquette, rules of clubs, social

norms, morality and so on).").
52. For a discussion of characteristics of law that particularly distinguish it from club rules, see RAZ, supra

note 10, at 116-20.
53. See, e.g., HART, supra note 16, at 181-207; Mark C. Murphy, The ExplanatoryRole of the Weak Natural

Law Thesis, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 3 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa
eds., 2013).

54. For an early discussion of the difference between law and thugs who make demands on us, see HART,
supranote 16, at 19-23. For more recent discussion on the difference between organized crime and legal systems,
see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 215-16 (2011). But see, Matthew Kramer, Requirements, Reasons, and Raz:
Legal Positivism and Legal Duties, 109 ETHICS, Jan. 1999, 375, 393-95 (eliding the mafia/law distinction).
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whims of others, 55 or, more colorfully, they live under the thumb of a mafioso. Ultimately,
mafiosos are under no compunction to justify their various demands; 5 6 their swords and
guns have the last word. To live under law, by contrast, the demands on our freedom
imposed by legal officials - these have to be undergirded by reasons, and the reasons given
by the officials have to be reasons that can do the justificatory work, at least by the
officials' light. Otherwise, we just have lying mafiosos. When the 'legal' system treats us
as involuntary clients of lying mafiosos, we are disrespected. 57 We are treated as mere
58
means for the pursuit of others' ends.
It is not important that we investigate the beliefs and desires of each and every legal
official in our jurisdiction to determine whether we are disrespected in this way. Rather,
as legal subjects, we should be able to look at our legal system as a whole and affirm it as
something that is decidedly not the mere whim of mafiosos. That means that the full set of
legal norms has to be undergirded by a coherent set of reasons. Otherwise, we should infer
we live under a mafia, under people who are not bound to give us reasons. This, no doubt,
sounds dramatic, but consider how inconsistent legal norms sound to someone bound by
them. The North Carolina government told Copening they were protecting his privacy by
showing his naked photos to a host of adults, releasing his name for journalists and others
to see, and threatening to put him on a sex offender registry. This would be hilarious if it
were not tragic.
III. PUTTING THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE TO WORK
Part I of this Article sought to expand our understanding of the Consistency
Principle, to demonstrate real-world violations of the Principle, and to explain why the
Principle is important to uphold. Though as the old adage goes, "The philosophers have
only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."' 59 In
keeping with this point, Part II shifts to developing a theory of legal relief for those harmed
by legal inconsistencies.
A. Due Process is the Remedy
Violations of the Consistency Principle are violations of due process of law.
Therefore, to remedy inconsistencies, those harmed by them ought to challenge their
55. A line from Joseph Raz is especially helpful here: "[A]n act which is the exercise of power is arbitrary
only if it was done either with indifference as to whether it will serve the purposes which alone can justify use
of that power or with belief that it will not serve them." RAz, supra note 10, at 219.
56. As Scott Shapiro notes, "When organized crime happens to solve moral problems, these occurrences are
treated by us as serendipitous,as happy accidents. By contrast, the moral benefits generated by ajust legal system
are not accidental or side effects of legal activity; rather, producing them is the very point of its activity."
SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 216.
57. Again, Raz helpfully explains this intuition: "[O]bservance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to
respect human dignity. Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and
plotting their future ...respecting their autonomy, their right to control their future." RAZ, supra note 10, at 221.
While Raz is talking generally about the rule of law, what he says applies specifically to the Consistency
Principle, an element of the rule of law.
58. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALs, at Ak. 429 (James W. Ellington
trans., 3d ed. 1993) ("Man, however, is not a thing and hence is not something to be used merely as a means.").
59. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach,in THE MARX-ENGELs READER 143, 145 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed.
1978).
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60
convictions or adverse administrative adjudications in courts on Due Process grounds.
If the defendant were successful, a court need not resolve the inconsistency; instead, the
court would exempt the prevailing defendant from the adverse consequences.
While fairly straightforward and general, advocating for this Due Process remedy is
likely to raise several questions. First, one might wonder what kind of due process
violation this is, procedural or substantive. Second, one might wonder why inconsistencies
violate due process in the first place, whether construed as procedural or substantive.
Third, before accepting this theory of relief, one might wonder about other alternatives.
Answering these three concerns sets the agenda for this section of the Article.
I argue below that inconsistency is problematic on both procedural and substantive
conceptions of due process. Concededly, the case may be stronger on the side of procedural
due process, but there is a good case on both fronts. After completing the argument for
Due Process remedy, alternative remedies are considered. As I demonstrate, none of the
surveyed remedies has the generality, clarity, and finality of the Due Process remedy.

1. Rule of Law Violations as Procedural Due Process Violations
As courts see it, the requirement to afford all people due process of law has tw6
components, procedural due process and substantive due process. Roughly, in procedural
due process analysis, a court asks whether, in the course of depriving someone of "life,
liberty, or property," 6 1 Government has engaged in the correct procedures, while in
substantive due process, a court asks whether the deprivation itself was undue, apart from
the procedures used to carry out the deprivation.
Accordingly, procedural due process might be seen as guaranteeing that the rule of
law (understood in a thin, formal way) will be respected in a particular jurisdiction. To
demonstrate the connection between procedural due process and formal accounts of the
rule of law, I enlist the help of Lon Fuller. In his influential work from the 1960s, Fuller
provides a list of eight formal rule of law principles. 62 Courts have already held that several
of these principles are requirements of procedural due process. The Consistency Principle,
which is on Fuller's list, has not been fully incorporated into procedural due process, but
it ought to be, for it is of no less moment than the other Fullerian principles that courts
have already adopted. By parity of reasoning, courts should declare inconsistency to be
antithetical to procedural due process.
63
Fuller's eight principles are as follows.
CONSISTENCY: the laws in a jurisdiction must be mutually consistent
ENFORCEMENT: the published version of laws must accord with how they are
enforced

60. Maybe prohibitory injunctive relief could be warranted too, but settling that questions takes us far afield
from the present inquiry, which is simply the general constitutional remedy.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. FULLER, supra note 6, at 38-39.
63. The preceding list paraphrases other scholarship on Fuller. Raff Donelson & lvar R. Hannikainen, Fuller
and the Folk: The InnerMorality of Law Revisited, in OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, VOL. 3

(T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe, & S. Nichols eds., forthcoming 2019). It is important to note that some scholars
understand Fuller as offering rule of law principles (what makes for good law), some take him to offer conditions
of legality (what makes a norm a legal norm), and some, like myself, see his principles as doing double duty.
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GENERALITY: laws must be general rules of conduct
INTELLIGIBILITY: laws must be capable of being understood by legal subjects
POSSIBILITY: laws may only require those acts subjects are physically capable of
performing
PROSPECTIVITY: in regulating conduct, law must be prospective
PUBLICITY: laws must be publicly announced
STABILITY: law may not change too frequently
Current understandings of fair notice, which is a requirement of procedural due
process, 64 incorporate a good deal of these Fullerian principles. Courts typically hold that
65
unintelligible laws do not provide fair notice and thereby violate procedural due process.
Court have also held that retrospective laws can fail to provide fair notice and thereby can
violate procedural due process. 66 Fuller's publicity principle has been understood
similarly. 67 Similar arguments have been advanced for the possibility principle. 68 There
are independent constitutional provisions that guarantee generality, 69 but even the
rationale for those provisions traffics in procedural due process language.
The foregoing should provide strong reason to conclude, by parity of reasoning, that
courts should see consistency as a part of procedural due process too. If that is not enough,
there is some limited (but on-point) precedent for seeing inconsistency as violating
procedural due process. Recall the case of Cardiffv. United States. The summary of his
case above focused on the 9th Circuit decision, 70 but Cardiff s case reached the Supreme
Court. 7 1 The Court affirmed the 9th Circuit and held that the reconcilable inconsistency
afflicting Cardiff violated procedural due process. The Court relied on a fair notice theory
72
in doing so. As I explain below, calling this a failure of notice is misleading.
Nonetheless, this case shows that the Court has recognized that legal inconsistencies are
an affront to procedural due process.
2. Inconsistent Laws as Irrational Violations of Substantive Due Process
In substantive due process review, a court asks whether a denial of "life, liberty, or
64. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("Engrained in our concept of due process is the
requirement of notice.").
65.

Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids or requires the

doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.").
66. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) ("The Due Process Clause also protects the
interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.").
67.

Cendant Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Dep't of Revenue, 226 P.3d 1102, 1109 (Colo. App. 2009), as modified

on denialofreh "g(Colo. App. 2009) ("There can be no secret laws because they violate very basic considerations
of due process.") (internal quotations omitted).
68. United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1997) (mentioning that some courts have held "it
would violate due process to convict a defendant for violations of a statute when compliance with it
is legally impossible" then holding otherwise).
1)generally prevent legislatures from
3; § 10, cl.
69. The Bill of Attainder Clauses (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.
simply declaring that some named parties are to receive ill treatment. This suggests commitment to the idea that
law ideally functions as setting out general rules of conduct, rules that parties can use to regulate their behavior,
rules that a judiciary might use to determine compliance.
70. See supra Part II.B.1.
71.
72.

United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
See infra Part III.A.3.c.
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property" was undue, apart from the procedures used to carry out the denial. To make this
determination, courts must first make a determination about the character of the right
denied. The right in question may be fundamental or not. If the right is fundamental, a
court will use strict scrutiny as its standard of review; that is, the court will inquire whether
infringing on the right was done to advance a compelling state interest and whether this
method of advancing the state interest was narrowly tailored to achieving that goal. When
the right is fundamental, unless the court finds both a compelling state interest and narrow
tailoring, the deprivation violates substantive due process. If the right is not fundamental,
courts employ the more deferential rationality test. On this standard of review, the court
inquires whether infringing on the right might advance any legitimate state interest and
whether using this method was rational. When the right is not fundamental, unless the
court finds that the state action was a rational means of achieving some legitimate state
interest, the deprivation violate substantive due process.73
Given this framework, how might inconsistencies figure? As noted above, all
inconsistencies are inconsistent at the level of justification. That means that there can be
no legitimate reason for the state to act as it does. There can be a legitimate reason for the
state to adopt one law and a legitimate reason to adopt another law, but, if there is an
inconsistency, there is can be no legitimate reason that could explain a polity having both
laws in force at once.
If this much is right, it means that all inconsistencies fail rationality review. Now, as
things stand, courts only consider the rationality of one legal norm at a time, but nothing
should prevent them from inquiring about a set of laws. If they did, they would see that
some would fail.
3. Issues with Other Theories of Relief
Above I sketched two arguments for the claim that courts should deem all violations
of the Consistency Principle to be violations of due process, both procedural and
substantive. Of course, this theory is not the only possible one. Scholars, courts, and
activists have suggested several other ways to remedy violations of the Consistency
Principle. Below, I consider five other theories and explain why the Due Process solution
is best.
a. FirstAmendment
The first alternative remedy to consider looks to a different constitutional provision.
Instead of taking a due process approach, one might argue that the North Carolina sexting
law violates the First Amendment. 7 4 This approach may appear to be a non-starter, for it
is no secret that courts have long recognized that the First Amendment does not protect
obscene materials in general 75 and explicit images of minors in particular. 76 Some scholars

73. The preceding overview of substantive due process can be found in many places; one of the best is ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 814-18 (4th ed. 2011).
74. Professor Mary Anne Franks is quoted making this argument in Miller, supra note 3.

75. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) ("[T]his Court has always assumed that obscenity is not
protected by the freedoms of speech and press.").
76. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982).
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have offered persuasive arguments to narrow those precedents; 7 7 nevertheless, three
additional problems would remain, even if one were to convince courts to read the First
Amendment differently.
First, even if sexting laws do violate the First Amendment, this will not help those
who encounter other laws that violate the Consistency Principle. Sexting may well be the
most visible issue that involves possible violations of the Consistency Principle, but it is
not the only area where violations exist. Other violations of the principle may not be
amenable to a First Amendment fix. For instance, the aforementioned disparity in
sentencing for powder and crack cocaine possession is also a large and widespread
problem that has persisted for decades. Since there is no First Amendment interest at stake
in cocaine prohibition, a First Amendment remedy would be inapt.
At this point, a proponent of the First Amendment remedy might concede that her
solution is partial and yet insist that the path forward is to use the First Amendment in
conjunction with other theories to address new violations of the Consistency Principle as
they arise. This emendation of the First Amendment remedy suggests a second problem.
Using ten theories to address a singular constitutional evil is an unwieldy strategy, one not
to be employed when a categorical approach like the due process approach is available.
Third, the First Amendment remedy fails to address the constitutional violation at
issue. The issue at hand, even in the sexting case, is not the curtailment of expression.
Rather, the issue is that jurisdictions are treating legal subjects unfairly by imposing
inconsistent laws. A First Amendment remedy misses that point. This criticism may seem
academic or pedantic, but there is a practical upshot. The First Amendment remedy is a
proxy remedy. Proxies, by their very nature, only approximate what the true antidote can
accomplish, and as such, proxies should not be used when one can just as easily use a
solution that can directly and completely address a problem.
b. Cormega's Law and Other Legislative Fixes
The First Amendment strategy is ill-suited to remedy violations of the Consistency
Principle because settled case law speaks against this strategy, because it cannot reach all
instances of inconsistency, because using it as a partial remedy is wieldy, and because the
strategy misses the point. Similar worries plague a second possible remedy for violations
of the Consistency Principle. Copening's mother advocated for a legislative fix to the
specific problem faced by her son. She imagined calling the legislation that would permit
78
teens to sext "Cormega's Law."
The most obvious problem with this legislative fix is its narrow scope. Cormega's
Law, were it enacted in North Carolina or across the United States, would not reach all
violations of the Consistency Principle. As noted above, sexting does not exhaust the scope
of the problem. There are three ways that one might amend the legislative fix to address
the narrowness: (1)One might propose a new law to address each inconsistency as one

77. E.g., John A. Humbach, "Sexting" and the FirstAmendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010).
78. Paul Woolverton, Sexting ChargesDismissedfor Fayetteville Teenager, FAYErEVILLE OBSERVER (July
7, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.fayobserver.com/bae76802-8b76-542b-9cd5-f0671cee3d47.html. It is unclear
from the journalistic report whether Copening's mother advocated for a law that would outright permit teen
sexting or whether she merely wanted a law with less strict penalties for the behavior.
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finds it in the particular jurisdiction in which it arises, (2) one might propose that Congress
and each state pass a single law that nullifies all instances of inconsistency, or (3) one
might hope for a single piece of legislation that purports to nullify all instances of
inconsistency. These emendations to the legislative fix invite new worries.
The first two emendations should be rejected as too unwieldy. Employing strategy
(1) could require countless new laws over time. Under (2), we need fifty-one new laws.
Though fifty-one is more manageable than the untold number of laws that might be needed
under (1), any scheme requiring fifty-one different sets of legislators to agree should be
rejected if a more practicable option exists. Option (3) is the most promising, but it is beset
by federalism problems. This contemplated single piece of legislation would have to be a
piece of federal law. If it were not federal law, it clearly could not remedy instances of
federal law that violate the Consistency Principle because state and local lawmakers cannot
80
79
repeal or otherwise invalidate federal law. Moreover, no states can bind other states.
However, even if it were a piece of federal legislation, purporting to bind all federal, state,
and local lawmakers, there would be a different federalism problem: Congress has no
81
power to regulate every area of state law.
c. Notice
A more promising and more general approach is to suggest that there is a failure of
notice when laws violate the Consistency Principle. Even from the perspective of someone
advocating for a due process theory, the notice theory has two advantages: first, notice
requirements are part of the requirements for due process, and thus, the notice theory is a
due process theory, and second, the Supreme Court has used a notice theory to strike down
82
a conviction when the defendant faced a reconcilable inconsistency.
Two problems attend the notice theory. First, current understandings of the notice
requirement cast doubt on the willingness of courts to extend the theory to inconsistent
justifications writ large. Second, just as a matter of semantics, it seems false to say that
one has insufficient notice when the laws in question are clear, public, and relatively
longstanding. I develop these two points in turn.
While courts have claimed that irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies
provide inadequate notice to legal subjects, I know of no case where the notice doctrine
has been extended to inconsistent justifications. This means that using a notice theory to
cover all varieties of inconsistencies would be an innovation. Innovation is not a bad thing,

79. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 17 (1858) (holding that states cannot nullify federal law).
80. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) ("[I]t is clear that no single State could ...
impose its own policy choice on neighboring States."); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor

Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 83 (1986) ("[One state] may not project its legislation into other States.") (internal
citations and brackets omitted); Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Court of Bait., 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No State

can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.").
81.

Of course, there is a theory on which Congress could regulate all areas of state law to attempt to remedy

all inconsistencies: it could claim that it was relying on its enforcement power granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. This theory, of course, requires that inconsistencies run afoul of
some Fourteenth Amendment guarantee. Thus, this legislative fix presupposes the correctness of some other
theory, which means that it is incomplete. Coincidentally, if my Due Process remedy is correct, Congress could

then pass statutes to try to stamp out inconsistencies.
82. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
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but if part of the draw of the notice theory is that courts are already doing something like
that, this attraction is only partially right.
That courts have not extended the fair notice doctrine to cover inconsistent
justifications should not be surprising, for it seems patently false to claim that one has no
notice of what Government will do in many cases of inconsistency. To see this, consider
the speed limit/minimum case. Along that stretch of highway, if one drives, one runs the
risk of getting caught for breaking one of those traffic laws. If this silly confluence of laws
were longstanding, it would be disingenuous to contend that one had no notice in the
normal sense of the word. Consider also the crack/powder cocaine disparity. A disparity
in some form has been in place for over thirty years. Anyone who receives punishment for
dealing crack had notice. Make no mistake, those who face inconsistent laws have been
harmed, but their harm is the disrespect that legal inconsistency necessarily occasions, not
the harm from a failure of notice.
d. Equal Protection
The next alternative remedy to consider is an equal protection theory. To understand
how this remedy is supposed to work and why it is ultimately too limited, we must set out
in brief modern equal protection doctrine.
Under modern equal protection doctrine, courts evaluate whether government action
violates the Constitution's guarantee of equality by reference to three standards of review:
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. 83 Strict scrutiny,
appropriate when the government action classifies on the basis of "race, alienage, or
national origin" or when the classification infringes on a fundamental right, requires the
government to show that the classification is narrowly tailored to furthering a compelling
government interest. 84 Intermediate scrutiny, appropriate when the government action
classifies on the basis of sex, gender, or legitimacy, requires the government to show that
85
the classification is substantially related to furthering an important government interest.
With the caveat for claims involving fundamental rights, the heightened forms of scrutiny,
strict and intermediate, are appropriate only when the government employs suspect
classifications, presumptively invalid classifications based on characteristics such as race
and sex. Rational basis review is appropriate for all other classifications. 86 Under rational
basis review, the government must show that the classification is rationally related to
87
furthering some permissible government interest.
Certain violations of the Consistency Principle also violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Schematically, this occurs when one legal norm provides some benefit to Group
A, another legal norm denies the benefit to Group B, and there is no permissible legal
83. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
84. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).

85. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also, Miss. Univ. for Women v.Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
86. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (mental ability); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,

313 (1976) (age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (socioeconomic status);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (profession).
87. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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reason for the exclusion. 88 Thus, some legal norms that violate the Consistency Principle
would also fail rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. However, the
important word in the previous sentence is some. There are many ways to violate the
Consistency Principle without following the structure of giving a benefit to one group and
withholding it from another. For instance, consider the irreconcilable inconsistency
offered at the outset, that of the student who must appear in court and appear in school at
the same time. This example features irrationality, but not an irrational classification. The
same is true of our speed limit/minimum example, for that case too features no irrational
classification. Indeed, many irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies will not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Laws with inconsistent justifications are those most

likely to violate the Clause.
The Equal Protection remedy is thus partial. It cannot reach all instances of
inconsistency. As noted above, ceterisparibus,partial remedies are to be rejected when a
complete remedy, like the Due process remedy, is on hand.
e. Canon of Statutory Construction
The final alternative remedy I consider is the suggestion that courts should, as a
matter of statutory construction, never read laws such that they violate the Consistency
Principle. 89 Call this the canon of statutory construction remedy, or the canon remedy. The
canon remedy is born from the thought that it is more controversial to claim that the
Constitutionprovides defense to parties adversely affected by inconsistencies than merely
to claim it is good policy to read legal texts so as to avoid inconsistency.
Two additional facts further support using the canon remedy. First, we already have
several canons that do similar work, so it would not be a great departure from current
practice. For instance, as noted above, lexposterior derogatprioriallows courts to defuse
90
many irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies. Also, the Absurd Results doctrine,
which allows courts to avoid legal outcomes that both seem required by the plain language
of a statute and patently absurd, could help courts in situations involving laws with
inconsistent justifications and maybe even inconsistencies between a law and its
enforcement. Because courts already have such tools, this is not uncharted territory, so
encouraging courts to use this remedy to avoid violations of the Consistency Principle
should not seem particularly risky. A second fact in support of the canon remedy is that it
appears to be a general way to uphold the Consistency Principle, unlike some of the other
proposed strategies.
Despite its benefits, the canon remedy is limited, not in scope but in power. To see
this, I begin by noting a familiar fact about canons of construction. Canons of construction
are defeasible. Noted scholars have contended that canons must sometimes give way to
other canons or to the dictates of commonsense. 9 1 Few would deny that canons must also

88. See, the poppers example, supra Part ll.A.2.
89. 1owe this suggestion to Michael Coenen who first mentioned it to me.
90. For an overview of the doctrine and a few central cases, see Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener's
Errors,and Statutory Interpretation,75 U. CtN. L. REV. 25, 53-56 (2006).
91. E.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REv. 395 passim (1950).
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give way to a legislature that insists on a particular construal of its legislation. 92 This latter

point is instructive for thinking about how the canon remedy would work in practice and
for seeing the limitation of this remedy. If the canon remedy were in use and were applied
to a set of irreconcilable criminal laws, it would allow a court to interpret the inconsistent
laws such that the criminal defendant would not be liable for not complying with one law
in the set. Essentially, the court would claim that one of the criminal laws at issue is to be
read as exempting parties from criminal liability if the party's criminal action was
compelled under threat of criminal penalty. Suppose that, after a court hands down its
ruling, the legislature writes a new law expressly disclaiming any such exemption. At this
point, a court would not be free to employ the consistency canon again, to read in
exemptions that the legislature deliberately withheld. Thus, the canon remedy can only go
so far if a legislature is committed to violating the rule of law.
The canon remedy is, then, a provisional kind of solution to violations of the
Consistency Principle. The Due Process remedy, by contrast, is final. Short of changing
our constitutional structure, no one will be able to disregard courts' attempts to stamp out
consistency violations. For those partial to the canon remedy, I should note what might
count as an added bonus for the Due Process remedy: courts will regularly read statutes
such that they do not contravene the Consistency Principle because of the constitutional
avoidance canon. 93 Thus, these two strategies will, more or less, coincide.
B. Objections
Several worries attend the kind of cause of action for which I advocate. First, one
might worry that there might be too many inconsistencies, such that no one can be
prosecuted for anything. Second and alternatively, one might worry that any seeming
inconsistency can be made consistent, such that this theory of relief will help no one. Third,
one might wonder whether there is positive value to having inconsistencies in the legal
system, value that might be lost, were my theory to be accepted. Fourth, one might worry
that this theory of relief empowers the judiciary too much.
1. Too Many Violations?
According to the first worry under consideration, violations of the Consistency
Principle abound. Perhaps they are inevitabilities. During periods of transition, a legal
system will take on new legal norms that are out of sync with the old. Some of the old will
face repeal because of its repugnancy to the new way of thinking. However, some of the
old will persist, innocuous enough to the new order, but still not susceptible to
rationalization within the new paradigm of thought. If this happens and happens all the
time, so this objection continues, I am suggesting that we swim against the tide, but such

92. As the Court noted about the absurd results canon, "[j]udicial perception that a particular result would be
unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what
Congress has plainly and intentionally provided." Comm'r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987).
93. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.").
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is a fool's errand.
There are two ways to respond to this worry. One can deny that violations are so
numerous, or one can bite the bullet and say that we ought to combat violations even if
they lurk at every turn. I shall take the first path, for true inconsistencies are less common
than a potential objector might think. It is implausible to suggest that irreconcilable
inconsistencies are everywhere. The most plausible version of this objection suggests that
laws with inconsistent justifications are everywhere. To see that this too is an exaggeration,
I consider two situations where significant inconsistencies seem to arise, but I show how
the seeming inconsistencies can be resolved. The proceeding test cases should allow us to
see that many seeming consistency problems can be similarly defused.
The first case concerns abortion. Legal abortion and fetal homicide laws appear to
be in tension. To put the point more formally, one might think there is an inconsistency
between permitting abortions and criminalizing as murder the intentional killing of a fetus
by someone other than a mother or her agents. 95 One might see inconsistent justifications
because one might believe that the only justification for permitting abortions is that fetuses
are not persons and further that the only justification for criminalizing as murder the
intentional killing of a fetus is that fetuses are persons. 96 This seeming inconsistency can
be fixed, as there are justifications for abortion that grant the personhood of fetuses. 97 One
might justify abortion by holding that fetuses have no moral right to a woman's bodily
resources, just as a sick patient may have no moral right to a hospital's resources - even if
denial of such resources would result in the respective person's death. Still, so this
justification would continue, it would be wrong for someone else to murder the fetus or
sick patient once the mother or hospital has decided to extend support for the furtherance
of the respective person's life.
The second case concerns a heart-wrenching story involving a family raising a child
with severe mental illness. 98 Jim and Toni Hoy adopted Daniel as a toddler and raised him
alongside their other three children. Though Daniel was a typical toddler, after a few years,
the young boy began having violent outbursts. The Hoys sought medical attention but often
to no avail because their private insurance would not cover the mental health care Daniel
needed. Daniel's condition continued to deteriorate, and, in one incident, he threw his
brother Chip "down the stairs and punched him over and over before their dad pulled the

94. The foregoing is my best reconstruction of an excellent point raised by Etienne Toussaint.
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1841 and Ala. Code § 13A-6-1 for laws that criminalize this way.
96. For a version of this argument, see Arina Grossu, Fetal Homicide Laws and the Logical Inconsistency of
Abortion, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.frc.org/op-eds/fetal-homicide-laws-and-thelogical-inconsistency-of-abortion.
97. E.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). The proceeding

argument in the text is a variant of Thomson's arguments in that article. For a similar point made thirty-four years
later, see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuringthe Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 724
(2006) ("Proponents of legal abortion have much to lose by agreeing to conduct the debate about reproductive

rights within a framework that hinges on the status of the fetus and thus sidelines the threat to the pregnant
woman's autonomy.").
98. Christine Herman, To Get Mental Health Helpfor a Child, DesperateParentsRelinquish Custody, NPR
(Jan. 2, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/01/02/673765794/to-get-mental-

health-help-for-a-child-desperate-parents-relinquish-custody. I thank Colin Miller for bringing this case to my
attention.
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boys apart." 99 When the Hoys again came to a hospital, seeking help for Daniel, they were
turned away because of their inability to pay. More bad news was to come that day, for the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services told Mrs. Hoy, "If you bring him
home, we're going to charge you with child endangerment for failure to protect your other
100
kids ...[a]nd if you leave him at the hospital, we'll charge you with neglect."
This second case may sound like it features an inconsistency. 10 1 If the Hoys take
Daniel home, they break the law; if they leave him where he is in the hospital, they break
the law. This would be an inconsistency of some kind, were the only two places in the
world the Hoy household and the hospital. Of course, this is not so. There were lots of
other options: they could have left Daniel with a relative or friend who does not have
children, one parent could have gotten a second home to raise Daniel away from the other
three children, or they could have done what they, in fact, did do. Jim and Toni
relinquished their custody of Daniel, so that he would become a ward of the state and
receive the medical attention he needed for free. No doubt this was a tragedy. No one
should minimize this, but, if the preceding is correct, what happened to the Hoys was no
violation of the Consistency Principle after all.
2. Can't Anything Be Made Consistent?
The foregoing response to the first objection, however, makes defending against the
second objection all the more difficult. One might worry that an ingenious government
attorney will always find a way to make sense of why a jurisdiction should have two laws,
even if there is a seeming tension between said laws. This weighty objection merits a more
thorough response than I can provide, so my response will be partial.
The due process argument I propose is much like rationality review used in both
substantive due process jurisprudence and equal protection jurisprudence. While
rationality review is easy to satisfy in many cases, 102 it is not toothless. Likewise, what
one might call Consistency Review would be easy to satisfy in many cases, but it, like
rationality review, would not be toothless either. 10 3 If the most ingenious government
attorneys sometimes lose on rationality review, which they do, 104 there is no reason to
99. Id.
100. Id.

101.

Colin Miller suggested this to me both in person and online, Colin Miller (@EvidenceProf), TWITTER

(Jan. 3, 2019, 9:48 PM), https://twitter.com/EvidenceProf/status/1081034583712374785 ("[A] Catch-22: take

him and you're committing a crime; DON"T [sic] take him home & you're committing a crime."). This is also
how Mr. Hoy himself understood his experience, for he said of the Department of Family and Children Services'
ultimatum, "[t]hey put our backs against the wall, and they didn't give us any options." Herman, supra note 98.
102. Jeffrey D. Jackson, ClassicalRational Basis and the Right to Be Free of ArbitraryLegislation, 14 GEO.

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 494 (2016) ("[A]lmost any possible legislation can be justified under modem rational
basis review."); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis
Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2071 (2015) ("Rational-basis review, the most deferential form of scrutiny under

the Equal Protection Clause, rarely invalidates legislation.").
103.

Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Courtfrom the 1971 Term Through

Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999) ("This Article addresses successful rational basis claims under the
Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court. These cases are sufficiently rare to stand out as unusual, but they
do exist."); Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of RationalBasis Review, 93 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 1317, 1341-53 (2018)

(arguing that we only view rationality review as ineffectual and overly-deferential owing to myopic focus on
Supreme Court cases, to the exclusion of state court cases).
104.

In Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 102, at n.2, we get a list of cases where the Supreme Court has held
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doubt that some will lose on consistency review too.
My response to this worry essentially says, "we must admit that some combinations
of laws are provably irrational if we accept that some single laws are provably irrational."
One can pretend that this response is fully satisfying, but I am more candid. Like with any
proposed remedy, one can only speculate on how courts might employ this. Maybe it will
be dead-letter, if adopted. There is no theoretical reason why that should be the case, but
as the great Dostoyevsky once quipped, "A thousand things may happen in reality which
10 5
elude the subtlest imagination."
3. The Value of Incoherence
The third objection rests on the idea that there is positive value to retaining
inconsistencies in the law. If there is such value, so this objection goes, getting rid of all
inconsistencies through the due process solution is wrongheaded. On its face, claiming
that we need to have inconsistency in the law can sound outlandish, but this objection is
something to take seriously. One might develop this objection by talking about the value
of federalism. Even if one dislikes federalism, it is stitched into the very fabric of American
constitutionalism. As such, it would be very bold to suggest that the Due Process Clause
requires jettisoning federalism.
To see how inconsistency and federalism concerns relate, consider the following
example. Several states permit the recreational use of marijuana or its medicinal use, while
the federal government bans its use for either medical or recreational purposes. Here we
have what appears to be a straightforward reconcilable inconsistency, for someone
'lighting up' in Denver, her conduct is permitted under state law but prohibited under
federal law. If there is an inconsistency here, it is the product of federalism: when one has
two independent legislatures, they can and reliably will reach different results at least
sometimes.
This objection, though primafacie compelling, rests on a mistake. It is not clear that
there is a reconcilable inconsistency in the marijuana case. Because the federal government
has limited powers 1 0 6 and because of the Supremacy Clause, 10 7 it should not be possible
for a state and the federal government to regulate the same conduct in disparate ways.
Either the federal government is regulating in a domain where it has legislative jurisdiction
or it is not. If it has legislative jurisdiction, conflicting state laws are null via the Supremacy
Clause. If it lacks legislative jurisdiction, it is federal overreach, and the state law should
stand. On the specific question of marijuana, the Court has already spoken, and federal

that a law violated Equal Protection, using rationality review: United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. Cty. Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
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law does preempt state law on this score.
This tidy response to the federalism objection skirts around some complicated
issues. The response above provides that the structure of American federalism itself does
not allow inconsistencies to arise because superseding measures prevent state and federal
law from ever conflicting. This way of dissolving the federalism objection is actually more
controversial than it might appear at first blush. As a matter of contemporary practice,
federal and state law regulate the very same conduct in disparate ways on a number of
issues, creating what appear to be reconcilable inconsistencies that no courts think to

invalidate. For instance, under the federal Controlled Substances Act, simply possessing a
small amount of marijuana, say ten grams, is punishable by up to a year in prison for a first
offense; 109 however, under Louisiana law, simply possessing ten grams of marijuana
carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days, if it is one's first offense. 1 10 If one thinks of
the United States as a single jurisdiction, we have a reconcilable inconsistency, for in the
same polity, the law claims that for a given act, one can be jailed for only fifteen days and
up to one year. These two norms are in obvious conflict. One can resolve this conflict by
denying that the nation is one jurisdiction. In fact, courts have long held that state and
federal governments are separate sovereigns for criminal justice purposes. If Louisiana
and the federal government are separate sovereigns, there is no inconsistency, for the
Consistency Principle only regulates the goings-on within a single jurisdiction. It would
thus appear that, again, the structure of American federalism itself does not allow
inconsistencies between state and federal law to arise; this time because discrepancies
between state and federal law count as laws from different jurisdictions, which is not an
issue the Consistency Principle aims to address. But is that so? Can it be reasonable to
treat the laws of Louisiana and federal law as coming from separate sovereigns, such that
when they conflict, they pose no greater rule of law problem than differing laws in
Mongolia and Malawi? If one answers the preceding questions in the affirmative, the
federalism objection neatly dissolves. If one answers in the negative, as I would, one can
still dissolve the federalism objection but at a cost. One would have to say, as claimed
above, that the Constitution bars states and the federal government from regulating the
same conduct in disparate ways. That not only means that states cannot legalize what the
federal government permissibly forbids (and vice versa), but it also means that the state
cannot be lenient on matters the federal government takes seriously (and vice versa).
4. Judicial Activism
The final objection to be considered is a worry about the potential for judicial
activism, should courts attempt to eliminate inconsistency from American law. In its most
plausible version, this objection admits that irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies
should be subject to judicial review and rectification, but the objector would draw the line
there. The objector would contend that the other two categories of inconsistency inconsistent justifications and inconsistency between a law's justification and its
enforcement - are too political. To find that two laws cannot rationally accommodate one
108. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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another is to make a subjective, political decision, one might think. In our system of
governance, we do not entrust judges with such decisions. Such decisions should remain
with the political branches of government, the executive and the legislature, for they, not
judges, are democratically accountable. Call this the JudicialActivism Complaint. Below
I advance two responses to the Complaint.
The first response is to reject the main premise of the Complaint, namely that judges
are not democratically accountable as a general matter. Were laws reviewed for
consistency, as I advocate, many cases would likely come before state courts. As I envision
it, most of the people who would litigate consistency concerns would be appealing criminal
convictions, convictions for violating state law. In particular, the average criminal
defendant bringing such an action would contend that the justification of the state statute
under which he was convicted was inconsistent with either the method of prosecuting him
or with the justification of some other state statute. In the envisioned situation, allowing
courts to resolve this problem would not be undemocratic because "[t]he majority of state
court justices and judges in this country are elected." 111 Of course, we can imagine
consistency issues also arising in federal courts; if so, the Complaint rears its head again.
However, we must be careful here. While federal judges are appointed, they are appointed
by elected officials in a process that is highly politicized; thus, it is hard to claim that the
demos has no input.
This first response is unlikely to convince those who would press the Judicial
Activism Complaint. Potential objectors can concede that judges have some democratic
accountability yet still worry that my proposal gives judges, bearing too little democratic
accountability, too much leeway to decide matters based on personal whims, rather than
law.
Here I shift, then, to the second response to the Complaint. Allowing Consistency
review will empower courts no more than employing current rationality tests. Courts, both
state and federal, already ask whether laws rationally advance their conceivable objectives
under rationality tests, which are components of both Equal Protection and Substantive
Due Process analyses. All this Article proposes is that courts make the same inquiry about
a larger set of laws. If Equal Protection review is not to be trucked over worries about
judicial activism, neither should Consistency review.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to fill a gap in both our legal understanding and practice.
Though previous writers have discussed legal inconsistency, this Article has offered a
more comprehensive view of the phenomenon, by differentiating the various kinds of legal
inconsistency, highlighting several of its instances, and explaining why avoiding
inconsistency matters. I have argued that there are four kinds of legal inconsistencies:
irreconcilable inconsistency, reconcilable inconsistency, inconsistent justifications, and
inconsistency between a law's justification and its enforcement. I argued that all of these
are problematic because, when a polity allows inconsistencies to persist, it disrespects its
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legal subjects, tells them that they do not deserve to be given reasons for the various legal
demands placed on them. In responding to the gap in our practice, no one has fully
theorized what remedies for inconsistency might exist under American law. I have put
forward a Due Process solution. Though this may not be the last word on either the
descriptive or remedial fronts, I hope to have pressed the conversation forward.

